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F. A. Hayek’s sympathetic agents
Sandra J. Peart and David M. Levy

Introduction
In his 2002 Nobel Lecture, Vernon Smith refers to “the simultaneous existence
of two rational orders,” which “are distinguishing characteristics of what we are
as social creatures” (Smith 2003: 466). For Smith, who invokes David Hume
and F. A. Hayek in this regard, both orders “are essential to understanding and
unifying a large body of experience from socioeconomic life and the experimental laboratory, and in charting relevant new directions for economic theory as
well as experimental-empirical programs” (Smith 2003: 466).1 This chapter
examines the nature and consequences of Hayek’s concept of human agency by
exploring the Hayekian two worlds of human conduct. We argue that Hayek
renounced the use of an explicit model of reclusive agency in favor of an implicit
model of sympathetic (correlated) agency.
In what follows, we show first that, for Hayek, behavior within the small
group – the “small band or troop,” or “micro-cosmos” – is correlated, resulting
from agents who are sympathetic one with another. We shall argue that sympathy in this context for Hayek entails the projection of one’s preferences onto
the preferences of others. With such correlated agency as the default in small-
group situations, Hayek attempts to explain the transition from small groups to a
larger civilization. We consider the role of projection in Hayek’s system at
length, because projection from the local group characterized by a well-defined
preference ordering to the world beyond the neighborhood may yield mistaken
beliefs. We shall argue that Hayek’s recognition of this outcome underlies his
pessimism about the democratic attempt to effect “social justice.”
Finally, we shall take up the question of whether and how to avoid this temptation to impose one set of preferences on another when local optima differ. We
address this question by considering how sympathetic projection can go awry in
the Classical tradition, specifically in Adam Smith’s system. The problem is, we
shall argue, one of “factions.” Smith famously worried about the destructive
nature of factions, their tendency to exploit the larger society (Levy and Peart
2008a). In the case of religious factions – perhaps the most famous example of
destructive behavior of this sort – Smith held that competition among small
groups might resolve the problem. Central to his argument is the realization that
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if the local groups are small enough, individuals in the larger society will belong
to overlapping organizations. As they move in their daily lives from one small
organization to another, they will find that the organizations differ and they will
thus learn to agree to disagree. People will come to accept the incoherence that
characterizes life in the larger sphere.

The totalitarian temptation
A key to Hayek’s account of the totalitarian lies in the difference between
Vernon Smith’s “two rational worlds”: an organization and an order. Hayek sets
out the difference between an organization – a collective with a coherent set of
goals (preference ordering) – and an order – a collective without this coherence.
People have, he maintains, personal experience with organizations, small groups,
but since they have none with the larger collection of organizations, orders, they
are left to theorize about the collectivity. As they do so, as they attempt to turn
their experience with orders into knowledge of organizations, they are tempted
in Hayek’s account by totalitarianism. By this, Hayek means that they are
tempted to imagine that the goals or preference ordering of the larger collective,
the order, are coherent in the way that the goals of the small collective, the
organization, might be. So, as people move from the small to the large group, a
failing of the imagination occurs. People project their preference for a single
preference ordering onto the group, and they desire the coherence that results.
We note in what follows that, as long as the experience and consequent preference orderings of the small groups vary, no such coherence results. More, the
very desire for coherence on a social level is inconsistent with a liberal order
characterized by a plurality of goals. Hayek is skeptical of any wide-scale solution to the temptation for imposing coherence, what we might call a totalitarian
temptation, that results. The only possible solution is piecemeal institutional
reform of one sort or another, for example, Hayek (1979), Hayek and Buchanan
(1978).
When Hayek wrote his Road to Serfdom, “totalitarianism” was an unfamiliar
word. In his system, Hayek turned totalitarianism into a term with precise
meaning.2 He distinguished between the theory of a collectivity and its manifestation, totalitarianism. For Hayek, the totalitarian norm is a complete ordering of
social states. Once we realize this, we can reformulate Hayek’s argument in
terms of standard social choice theory. What Kenneth Arrow called a “dictatorship” is related to the requirements for Hayek’s “complete ethical code” of totalitarianism.3 This totalitarian “ethical code” is characterized by a “unitary end” so
that only one person’s goals are allowed to matter. Arrow’s impossibility
theorem establishes that the goal of a complete ordering of social states is inconsistent with non-dictatorship as a formal matter.4 But Arrow leaves open the
question of whether a collectivity might prefer coherence to non-dictatorship.5 In
Hayek’s account, the projection motivates the temptation to choose coherence
over non-dictatorship, so that people who are habituated to coherence in the
small group might also prefer coherence to non-dictatorship in the large group.
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This sheds new light on Hayek’s “slippery slope” argument, which might be
reformulated as a recognition (and a warning against the recognition) that individuals might willingly cede freedom of choice to a dictator or a planner because
that leaves them with the coherence that characterizes their other spheres of life.
We shall emphasize Hayek’s treatment of the small group in writings after
his 1960 Constitution of Liberty in which the small group is viewed as natural
in some biological sense.6 The full measure of Hayek’s turn toward biological
foundations is not very well understood. There is a completely non-biological
account of the demand for coherence in his 1949 “Intellectuals and Socialism.”
Here he distinguishes among three mutually exclusive groups – ordinary people,
intellectuals, and specialists/scholars. Ordinary people have no use for systematic philosophy so they are little interested in imagining the world as coherent.
Specialists/scholars are all too aware of the puzzles at the frontier of their discipline so they address themselves to making the pieces of their world fit
together. Hayek’s characterization of intellectuals – “second-hand dealers in
ideas” – although perhaps meant as an insult, makes the point quite nicely. To
explain the world to non-specialists one is tempted to make it more coherent
than it really is.
Intellectual is an occupation. The imposition of coherence comes from the
incentives of the position. Hayek’s account of the intellectuals’ demand for
coherence suggests that among intellectuals one would find more willingness to
trade democracy for coherence than in the other groups. This is certainly a testable implication. Hayek seems to have given up such incentive-based arguments
when he started to write about small groups with unitary goals as natural. It is
useful to note that if one distrusts such naturalistic accounts of the sort we shall
explore next, there are incentive-based alternatives to which one might appeal.

Hayekian sympathy as correlated behavior
When we propose that Hayek works with “sympathetic” agency we need to
clarify that his account is not necessarily the same as Adam Smith’s or, for that
matter, pre-Smithian accounts. “Sympathy” is the transliteration of an ancient
Greek technical term, meaning “co-affective” or “interactive.” The word was
extensively employed by both Greek and Roman philosophers in the Stoic tradition who posited cosmic sympathy as the hidden force which moved all parts of
the world.7 So, sympathetic explanations offered correlation without evidence of
a causal mechanism. The correlated motion of the tides and the moon was a once
widely used instance of how sympathy was said to play out in the physical
world. To explain sympathetic principles of motion, the mathematical model of
vibrating strings was developed. As sympathetic motion came to be idealized,
“harmony” came to be understood not only as a musical term but also as an
ethical goal (Levy and Peart 2008a).
Adam Smith’s account of sympathy stands out as the transforming moment in
the historical record. He took the notion of sympathy as a form of vibration that
resulted from a physical connection and transformed it instead into an act of
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imagination, a projection of one’s preferences to another in the same situation.
The difference is important because, before Smith, people were said to sympathize only with their equals; while Smith made the case that we can in fact sympathize with those who are quite unlike ourselves. In such cases, we may initially
make mistaken projections, but we come to refine our ability to sympathize.
Affection is then nothing more than habituated sympathy (mediated by institutions), and the act of sympathizing comes to equalize, to make us more alike.
This is the key point that separated David Hume, who held that sympathy is a
physical reaction, a form of empathy, and Smith, for whom sympathy is the projected act of imagination (Peart and Levy 2005).
Hayek uses sympathy to explain widely observed imitative behavior.8 Imitation generates correlated behavior which itself has a key methodological implication for Hayek: recognition of interpersonal dependence causes him to be
deeply skeptical about using dependence-blind statistical methods in
economics.9
The correlated behavior that features most prominently in Hayek’s construction is reciprocity. In Hayek’s construction, the sense of reciprocity explains the
movement from small groups to civilization. We quote a passage from his
important 1966 address to the Mont Pèlerin Society. Here Hayek differentiates
between “reciprocal but not common purposes.” He argues that the reciprocal
behavior, first observed in a small tribe, becomes a norm for “ever wider circles
of undetermined persons”:10
29. The growth from the tribal organization, all of whose members served
common purposes, to the spontaneous order of the Open Society in which
people are allowed to pursue their own purposes in peace, may thus be said
to have commenced when for the first time a savage placed some goods on
the boundary of his tribe in the hope that some member of another tribe
would find them and leave in turn behind some other goods to secure the
repetition of the offer. From the first establishment of such a practice which
served reciprocal but not common purposes, a process has been going on for
millennia which, by making rules of conduct independent of particular purposes of those concerned, made it possible to extend these rules to ever
wider circles of undetermined persons and eventually might make possible a
universal peaceful order of the world.
(Hayek 1966: 168)
The notion of even a small group with a common purpose might seem odd for an
economist today, but Hayek’s appeal to what is now known as the “investment”
or “trust” game shows just how far he is from the rational (independent) actor
model of the 1960s. The trust game has a trivial solution, the wandering tribe
which encounters a free lunch, picks it up and leaves nothing. The stationary
tribe, in anticipation, leaves nothing. In point of fact, the Hayekian reciprocal
outcome where each group leaves food for the other group(s) is borne out in
experimental economics.11
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Hayek on projection
For Hayek, as noted above, sympathy generates imitative behavior. This is coherent inside Hayek’s larger system in which he provides an alternative to accounts
based on the assumption of independent agency. Such an alternative requires a
theory of dependent agency. The central problem in Hayek’s theory of mind is
classification or grouping. The classification of objects into groups that are the
“same” does not depend upon the objects “really” being the same. Instead, they
are (or they become) the “same” because they are classified that way.12 To move
beyond the unconscious, Hayek depends upon projection. By an act of imagination, others become like us and so meaning becomes intersubjective.13
We consider in order Hayek’s account of projection about other people who
“really” are much like us and projection about those at a great distance from us.
We will distinguish reliable from unreliable projection by appealing to the distance involved. We will return to the link between reliability and distance after
we consider Hayek’s argument.
Reliable projection
Without distinguishing between the account in Hume and that in Smith, Hayek
maintains that his approach is a return to the Scottish tradition.14 In either event,
Hayek’s reformulation of the Scottish tradition rules out the “existence of isolated
or self-contained individuals” and presupposes dependent human agency instead:
What, then, are the essential characteristics of true individualism? The first
thing that should be said is that it is primarily a theory of society, an attempt
to understand the forces which determine the social life of man, and only in
the second instance a set of political maxims derived from this view of
society. This fact should by itself be sufficient to refute the silliest of the
common misunderstandings: the belief that individualism postulates (or
bases its arguments on the assumption of ) the existence of isolated or self-
contained individuals, instead of starting from men whose whole nature and
character is determined by their existence in society.
(1946: 6)15
Hayek’s discussion of eighteenth-century conceptions of sympathy emphasizes
that sympathy plays a role in how individuals come to understand the world
around them. We quote at some length from his 1963 British Academy lecture.
Here, Hayek explains how something like Smith’s imaginative projection allows
us to classify, to connect activities as “wholes,” to say that some of my actions
and some of your actions are the same thing, they have the same name, they are
elements of a class:
We have yet to consider more closely the role which the perception of the
meaning of other people’s actions must play in the scientific explanation of
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the interaction of men. The problem which arises here is known in the discussion of the methodology of the social sciences as that of Verstehen
(understanding). We have seen that this understanding of the meaning of
actions is the same kind as the understanding of communications (i.e.,
actions intended to be understood). It includes what the eighteenth-century
authors described as sympathy and what has more recently been discussed
under the heading of “empathy” (Einhühlung). Since we shall be concerned
chiefly with the uses of these perceptions as data for the theoretical social
sciences, we shall concentrate on what is sometimes called rational understanding (or rational reconstruction), that is, on the instances where we
recognize that the persons in whose actions we are interested base their
decisions on the meaning of what they perceive. The theoretical social sciences do not treat all of a person’s actions as an unspecifiable and unexplainable whole but, in their efforts to account for the unintended
consequences of individual actions, endeavour to reconstruct the individual’s reasoning from the data which to him are provided by the recognition of the actions of others as meaningful wholes.
(1963: 58–9)
The ability to classify offers a foundational account of how we understand unarticulated rules: “We have seen that our capacity to recognize action as following
rules and having meaning rests on ourselves already being equipped with these
rules” (1963: 59). In the years before he published The Sensory Order, Hayek
considered the classification of others’ actions based on a type of projection,
what “we know solely from knowledge of our mind.” In the “great majority of
instances,” reasoning from such “analogies” is accurate:
If we consider for a moment the simplest kinds of actions where this
problem arises, it becomes, of course rapidly obvious that, in discussing
what we regard as other people’s conscious actions, we invariably interpret
their action on the analogy of our own mind: that is, that we group their
actions, and the objects of their actions, into classes or categories which we
know solely from the knowledge of our mind. We assume that the idea of a
purpose or a tool, a weapon or food, is common to them with us.
(1943: 63)
If I see for the first time a big boulder or an avalanche coming down the side
of a mountain toward a man and see him run for his life, I know the meaning
of this action because I know what I would or might have done in similar
circumstances.
There can be no doubt that we all constantly act on the assumption that
we can in this way interpret other people’s actions on the analogy of our
mind and that in the great majority of instances this procedure works. The
trouble is that we can never be sure.
(1943: 64)
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Such is the nature of “anthropomorphic explanations” for Hayek, who wonders
whether they constitute science, or not (1943: 65). Since economics is mathematically certain, Hayek concludes that they have no place in the pure logic of choice.16
Projection at great distance
Projection also enters into Hayek’s account of how individuals make the transition from small to larger groups. In this transition, projections create the key
difficulty of the modern world. Hayek argues that people project from what they
know, their experience with organizations characterized by a unified goal, to that
which they do not know, societies without a goal. In so doing, they are tempted
by totalitarianism. To this we now turn.
The foundation for the attack on social justice in the second volume of Law,
Legislation and Liberty is laid in the 61 numbered, tightly argued paragraphs of
Hayek’s 1966 address to the Mont Pèlerin Society. In this essay Hayek sets out
the difference between an organization – a collective with a coherent set of goals
(preference ordering) – and an order – a collective without this coherence of
goals. We are tempted by totalitarianism, in Hayek’s account, when we attempt
to turn an order into an organization.
The first two paragraphs of the address review Hayek’s 1946 distinction
between British and Continental liberalism. The third paragraph distinguishes
liberalism from democracy. Hayek’s terminology sets liberalism definitionally
opposed to totalitarianism and democracy definitionally opposed to authoritarianism. The possibility of democratic totalitarianism and authoritarian liberalism
are empirical issues (1966: 161). Those who attended the Mont Pèlerin Society
in 1966 would not need to be told that totalitarianism is described in Road to
Serfdom as the state of society in which only one hierarchy of goals, preference
ordering, is allowed.17
Paragraphs 6–13 discuss the relationship between liberalism and a spontaneous order. A spontaneous order emerges out of decisions made by individuals
without common goals. As such, it serves as a natural environment for liberalism. Hayek next confronts the confusion between an “order” and an “organization.” While the order is characterized by reciprocity, it differs from the
organization precisely because it lacks coherence, a single aim:
15. An economy in the strict sense of the word in which we can call a household, a farm, an enterprise or even the financial administration of government an economy, is indeed an organization . . . in the service of a unitary
order of purposes. It rests on a system of coherent decisions in which a
single view of the relative importance of the different competing purposes
determines the uses to be made of the different resources.
(1966: 164)
16. The spontaneous order of the market resulting from the interaction of
many such economies is something so fundamentally different from an
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economy proper that it must be regarded as a great misfortune that it has
ever been called by the same name. . . . I propose that we call this
spontaneous order of the market a catallaxy in analogy to the term
“catallactics”, . . .
(1966: 164)
17. The chief point about a catallaxy is that, as a spontaneous order, its
orderliness does not rest on its orientation on a single hierarchy of ends, and
that, therefore, it will not secure that for it as a whole the more important
comes before the less important.
(1966: 164)
The outcome in a spontaneous order cannot, strictly speaking, be described as
“just” since this would required a single (unanimously agreed-upon) hierarchy of
ends. But this is not how people see things. They project what they know onto
what they do not know. What they know is coherent, the single hierarchy of ends
in the organization, so they imagine that what they do not know, the order,
should also be characterized by a single set of preferences. They impose the
coherence of what they know on what do not know: “37. That the concept of
justice is nevertheless so commonly and readily applied to the distribution of
incomes is entirely the effect of an erroneous anthropomorphic interpretation of
society as an organization rather than as a spontaneous order” (1966: 171). From
this follows the temptation to totalitarianism: “38. All endeavours to secure a
‘just’ distribution must thus be directed towards turning the spontaneous order of
the market into an organization or, in other words, into a totalitarian order”
(1966: 171).
Let us reformulate Hayek’s argument in terms of the Arrow impossibility
literature. The question Hayek is asking is, what condition guarantees that social
decision procedures are transitive? The answer he is offering is dictatorship:
where one agent’s preferences are the only ones that count. This is what Hayek
calls totalitarianism.
So, to combine the terminology from both Arrow and Hayek, society is faced
with a trade-off between coherence and liberal democracy. Which will prevail?
The formal properties of axiomatic systems give no guidance. Hayek’s 1949
“Intellectuals and Socialism” argued that intellectuals, more than experts or the
public, were most tempted by totalitarianism. The intellectuals’ desire for coherence was at the root of this temptation.18 Hayek leaves unexplained the question
of why intellectuals are more concerned with coherence relative to truth than
experts or ordinary people – the other ideal types in his 1949 story. Perhaps
Adam Smith’s connection between affection and habitual sympathy provides an
answer. Those who are habituated to coherence, who spend the most time in
coherent systems of thought will, other things being equal, be more likely to
think social coherence worth the cost. Hayek’s claim might be correct but for an
economic account, we would require a specification of the goals and constraints
of intellectual life. This Hayek does not provide.
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The tyranny of the minority
Hayek argues that there is a strong tendency for a well organized group to
exploit a less organized group. Although people within small groups are connected by bonds of sympathy and reciprocity, the groups themselves are connected by neither personal ties nor considerations of reciprocity. Hayek’s
technical criticism of interest-group democracy is sketched in 1960 in the
context of corporate voting rights, a work that is apparently unknown even to
scholars who have recently begun to explore the very same corporate pyramids
that troubled Hayek.19 Since the problem of corporate pyramids highlights the
importance of Hayek’s early concern, it provides a useful case to work out the
logic of his argument. This also an instance of Hayek’s account of small-group
action which does not have biological roots.
In Hayek’s account, when corporate pyramids exist, the controlling stockholders in one company can run other corporation(s) for their benefit, leaving
shareholders in the other corporation(s) with poor options:
where the shares of one corporation are owned by another corporation, . . .
nobody seriously questions that any control thus exercised by the second
corporation over the first can legitimately be employed to increase the
profits of the second. In such a situation it is clearly possible, and not
unlikely, that the control over the policy of the first corporation will be used
to channel the gains from its operations to the second, and that the first
would be run, not in the interest of all its stockholders but only in the interest of the controlling majority. When the other stockholders discover this it
will be too late for them to apply any remedy. The only possibility they will
have is to sell out – which may be just what the corporate stockholder
wants.
(1960: 309)
How did this come about? An evolutionary failure? So it seems. The lack of
deliberation and awareness created the failure:
I must admit that I have never quite understood the rationale or justification
of allowing corporations to have voting rights in other corporations of which
they own shares. So far as I can discover, this was never deliberately
decided upon in full awareness of all its applications, but came about simply
as a result of the conception that, if legal personality was conferred upon the
corporation, it was natural to confer upon it all powers which natural
persons possessed. But this seems to me by no means a natural or obvious
consequence. On the contrary, it turns the institution of property into something quite different from what it is normally supposed to be. The corporation thereby becomes, instead of an association of partners with a common
interest, an association of groups whose interests may be in strong conflict;
and the possibility that a group which directly owns assets amounting only
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to a small fraction of those of the corporation, may, through a pyramiding of
holdings, acquire assets amounting to a multiple of what they own
themselves.
(1960: 309)
The correction is to take away the connected corporation’s right to vote:
There seems to me to exist no reason why a corporation should not be
allowed to own stock of another corporation purely as an investment. But it
also seems to me that such a stock, so long as it is owned by another corporation, should cease to confer a right to vote.
(1960: 309)
So, corporate pyramiding turns governance from a matter of individuals with
common interests to groups with conflicting interests. Hayek’s cure is to abolish
the link between investment and corporate democracy – the “one share one vote”
principle fails to reflect the interest of the majority of assets, so Hayek proposes
a change in the voting rules.
All of this, majorities controlling majorities resulting in the minority extortion
of majorities, evolutionary failure and drastic revision of the right to vote, is to
be found in Law, Legislation and Liberty. Here, Hayek makes the case that
majority rule in the larger world has become something akin to the world of
corporate pyramids, in which a group which is large enough to control interest
groups extract transfers from the majority itself. Indeed, here we find Hayek
defending the Athenian practice of election by lot!20 It is in the context of the
tyranny of the minority that Hayek offered such drastic reforms.21 “Progress” has
been reversed and Hayek worries about the dictator who will save society from
themselves:
What I have been trying to sketch in these volumes (and the separate study
of the role of money in a free society) has been a guide out of the process of
degeneration of the existing form of government, and to construct an intellectual emergency equipment which will be available when we have no
choice but to replace the tottering structure by some better edifice rather
than resort in despair to some sort of dictatorial regime.
(1979: 152)
Hayek’s despair is such that he concludes there is no path by means of a spontaneous order to take us out of the disorder. Evolution has failed.22 To solve this
evolutionary failure, we need government and government requires purpose.

Factions and competition
Projection in the small, in our local environment, works far more smoothly in
Hayek’s account than projection in the large.23 The difference between action in
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the small and in the large is central to Hayek’s discussion of the information
aggregation properties of markets which culminated in the 1945 “Use of Knowledge in Society.” Individuals with local knowledge act in such a way that prices
reflect the aggregation of local information. To preserve these information aggregation properties, individuals need to “submit” to prices and the price system.24
Hayek’s argument about projection from the local organization to the social
order depends, it seems, on the implicit assumption that there is only one local
organization (or, if there are many, they are sufficiently similar in preferences).
But what if there are many? Hayek’s important concern about one faction
exploiting the larger society is a general version of the problem of religious factions which Adam Smith encountered but did not solve in Theory of Moral Sentiments. In Wealth of Nations, Smith offered a possible solution to the problem
(Levy and Peart 2009). What is important for the present argument is just how
critical it is in Smith’s proposal that a person belongs not just to one but to many
organizations.
The consequence of competition in religion is to change the social distance.
Hierarchy in a sect is replaced by equality across sects. We no longer have a
world of leaders and followers, we have equals agreeing to disagree to avoid
loneliness (Levy and Peart 2008a):
The teachers of each sect, seeing themselves surrounded on all sides with
more adversaries than friends, would be obliged to learn that candour and
moderation which is so seldom to be found among the teachers of those great
sects whose tenets, being supported by the civil magistrate, are held in veneration by almost all the inhabitants of extensive kingdoms and empires, and who
therefore see nothing round them but followers, disciples, and humble admirers. The teachers of each little sect, finding themselves almost alone, would be
obliged to respect those of almost every other sect, and the concessions which
they would mutually find it both convenient and agreeable to make to one
another, might in time probably reduce the doctrine of the greater part of them
to that pure and rational religion, free from every mixture of absurdity, imposture, or fanaticism, such as wise men have in all ages of the world wished to
see established; but such as positive law has perhaps never yet established,
and probably never will establish, in any country: because, with regard to religion, positive law always has been, and probably always will be, more or less
influenced by popular superstition and enthusiasm.
(Smith 1776: v.i.197)
It is important to notice Smith has implicitly appealed here to a notion of overlapping organizations.

Conclusion: how many organizations are in a person’s life?
In his Nobel Lecture discussed at the outset, Vernon Smith notes that generations of economists have ignored Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments.
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Indeed, the incoherence of Wealth of Nations and Theory of Moral Sentiments is
known as Das Adam Smith Problem. Because Smith’s proposed solution to the
problem of religious factions is precisely in the intersection of these two books
(Levy 1978; Levy and Peart 2008a), it seems to have been overlooked by even
the most careful scholars.
Smith’s solution is important for Hayek’s argument because in Smith’s
account competition ensures that religious groups become populated by people
who belong to overlapping organizations. Perhaps a family will be co-
religionists, but there is no reason to believe that the people with whom they
work will belong to the same sect. In this society of competitive religions, a person’s daily life weaves through different organizations, each of which may well
have a coherent goal. But the goals will differ. Which goal is projected to the
social order? Toleration of diversity is a plausible equilibrium if only because
Adam Smith said so and because the experience of American religious toleration
is consistent with this teaching.
Competitive discussion and toleration of diversity are at the heart of John
Stuart Mill’s On Liberty, in which adherents to each set of beliefs will present
their goals. It seems to be the case that, for Hayek, an individual can be a
member of only one organization. Whether membership in diverse organizations
will turn an organization into an order remains an open question.

Notes
1 Smith (2003: 466). Smith’s paper opens with a quotation from David Hume and then
from Hayek on the two worlds in which people function.
“we must constantly adjust our lives, our thoughts and our emotions, in order to live
simultaneously within different kinds of orders according to different rules. If we
were to apply the unmodified, uncurbed rules (of caring intervention to do visible
‘good’) of the . . . small band or troop, or . . . our families . . . to the (extended order of
cooperation through markets), as our instincts and sentimental yearnings often make
us wish to do, we would destroy it. Yet if we were to always apply the (competitive)
rules of the extended order to our more intimate groupings, we would crush them”
(Friedrich A. Hayek, 1988: 18; italics are his, parenthetical reductions are mine).
(Smith 2003: 465)
Smith’s quotation omits the words “micro-cosmos” and “macro-cosmos” (Hayek
1988: 18), which are signatures of the Stoic tradition. In the ancient texts, “micro-
cosmos” defined a person, as opposed to “the small band or troop, or of, say, our families” (Hayek 1988: 18). The movement from the individual to the small group is
important for this argument discussed below.
2 Referring to the political consequences of collectivism, Hayek writes: “In short, they
are totalitarian in the true sense of this new word which we have adopted to describe
the unexpected but nevertheless inseparable manifestations of what in theory we call
collectivism” (1944: 59). The Oxford English Dictionary gives the first usage of
“totalitarianism” in 1926 in the context of Italian fascism. Ezra Pound is quoted from
1937. Hayek knew of Pound and writes this about John Milton: “It is, perhaps, significant that our generation has seen a host of American and English detractors of
Milton – and that the first of them, Mr. Ezra Pound, was during this war broadcasting
from Italy!” (Hayek 1944: 220).
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3

The various kinds of collectivism, communism, fascism, etc., differ between
themselves in the nature of the goal towards which they want to direct the efforts
of society. But they all differ from liberalism and individualism in wanting to
organise the whole of society and all its resources for this unitary end, and in
refusing to recognise autonomous spheres in which the ends of the individuals are
supreme. In short, they are totalitarian.
(Hayek 1944: 60)

Hayek argues against this and concludes the paragraph: “It presupposes, in short, the
existence of a complete ethical code in which all the different human values are allotted their due place.” He continues in the next paragraph: “The conception of a complete ethical code is unfamiliar and it requires some effort of imagination to see what
it involves. We are not in the habit of thinking of moral codes as more or less
complete.”
4 The connection between Hayek’s argument and Arrow’s impossibility theorem was
seen earlier by Boettke and Leeson (2002) and reported as part of seminar commentary by Caldwell (2007: 30). Neither lays out Hayek’s argument that this demand for
coherence comes from a projection from a natural group with unitary goals to an
order.
5 Buchanan and Yoon (2006) discuss how unsettling the Arrow–Black result was.
Buchanan (1954) stands out in retrospect as uniquely undisturbed by social incoherence. Buchanan and Yoon (2006) offer a solution to the Arrow impossibility theorem
by something akin to a rational expectations move: if Arrow’s agents know what
Arrow knows, then their voting behavior may change.
6 In Road to Serfdom the unitary group was explained by primitive rules and taboos.
From the primitive man, who was bound by an elaborate ritual in almost every
one of his daily activities, who was limited by innumerable taboos, and who could
scarce conceive of doing things in a way different from his fellows, morals have
more and more tended to be merely limits.
(Hayek 1944: 101)
In his important 1966 “Principles of a Liberal Social Order,” the small group is
“tribal” (Hayek 1966: 168).
7 The disrepute into which sympathy fell can be gauged by the simple fact that “occult”
is Latin for hidden. Indeed, the connection between sympathy and magic is a commonplace among specialists (Levy and Peart 2008a).
8 Hayek (1963: 46–7):
The main difficulty which has to be overcome in accounting for these phenomena
is most clearly seen in connection with the phenomenon of imitation. The attention paid to this by psychologists has fluctuated greatly and after a period of
neglect it seems again to have become respectable. The aspect which concerns us
here probably has not again been stated more clearly since it was pointed out at
the end of the eighteenth century by Dugald Stewart [Hayek cites Dugald Stewart,
Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, chapter on “Sympathetic
Imitation”].
9 Hayek (1945: 83):
The comparative stability of the aggregates cannot, however, be accounted for –
as the statisticians occasionally seem to be inclined to do – by the “law of large
numbers” or the mutual compensation of random changes. . . . The continuous flow
of goods and services is maintained by constant deliberate adjustments, by new
dispositions made every day in the light of circumstances not known the day
before, by B stepping in at once when A fails to deliver.
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Hayek (1964: 29):
Statistics, however, deals with the problem of large numbers essentially by eliminating complexity and deliberately treating the individual elements which it
counts as if they were not systematically connected . . . it deliberately disregards
the fact that the relative position of the different elements in a structure may
matter.
The importance of this aspect of Hayek’s argument is emphasized in Khan (2008).
10 One wonders how many in the audience caught the Stoic image of moral obligation?
Each one of us is as it were entirely encompassed by many circles, some smaller,
others larger, the latter enclosing the former on the basis of their different and
unequal dispositions relative to each other. The first and closest circle is the one
which a person has drawn as though around a centre, his own mind. This circle
encloses the body and anything taken for the sake of the body. For it is virtually
the smallest circle, and almost touches the centre itself. Next, the second one
further removed from the centre . . . contains parents, siblings, wife, and children.
The third one has in it uncles and aunts, grandparents, nephews, nieces, and
cousins. The next circle includes the other relatives, and this is followed by the
circle of local residents, then the circle of fellow-tribesman, next that of fellow-
citizens, and then in the same way the circle of people from the neighbouring
towns, and the circle of fellow-countrymen. The outermost and largest circle,
which encompasses all the rest, is that of the whole human race. Once these have
been all surveyed, it is the task of a well tempered man, in his proper treatment of
each group, to draw the circles together somehow towards the centre, and to keep
zealously transferring those from the enclosing circles into the enclosed ones.
(Hierocles in Long and Sedley 1987: 349)
11 Berg et al. (1995), cited in Smith (2003). A JSTOR search on “Hayek” and “Dickhaut” turns up only two papers, Smith (1994) and (2003), which discuss the work of
both authors.
12 Thus, Hayek imagines a machine which puts balls into a receptacle:
any grouping of different balls by the machine which places them in the same
receptacle will create a class which is based exclusively on the action of the
machine and not on any similarity which those balls possess apart from the action
of the machine.
(Hayek 1952: 49)
13 Hayek (1952: 134):
There appears to exist three prima facie differences between such unconscious
and conscious behavior which we may provisionally describe by saying that in
conscious behavior a person will, (a) be able to “give an account” of what he is or
has being doing.
Hayek (1952: 135):
When we say that a person is able to “give an account” of his mental processes we
mean by this that he is able to communicate them to other people by means of
“symbols”, that is by actions, which when perceived by other people, will occupy
in their mental order a position analogous to that which they occupy in his own;
and which, in consequence, will have for those other persons a meaning similar to
that which it possesses for him.
14 Hayek stresses the common elements in Mandeville, Hume and Smith. The identification of Mandeville and Smith was challenged by Harrod (1946). The identification of
Mandeville with laissez-faire – in the sense that Adam Smith’s position can be so
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described – is debated by specialists, Viner (1953) and Rosenberg (1963), with Hayek
siding with Rosenberg (Hayek 1967a.) Viner’s correspondence with both Rosenberg
and Hayek is discussed in Irwin (1991).
15 Recall Hayek’s distinction in The Road to Serfdom, discussed above, between “collectivism” as a theory and “totalitarianism” as a norm.
16 A foundational difference between Hayek and classical political economy, as
explained by Charles Babbage, is that political economy depends upon median expectation (Peart and Levy 2005). An inference that “works” as well as Hayek stipulates
here would pass the Babbage test.
17 Hayek (1944: 162) quotes Nietzsche as “entirely in the spirit of collectivism”:
A thousand goals have there been so far, for there have been a thousand peoples.
Only the yoke for the thousand necks is still lacking: the one goal is lacking.
Humanity still has no goal. But tell me, my brothers, if humanity still lacks a goal
– is humanity itself not still lacking too? Thus spoke Zarathustra.
(Nietszche 1954: 170)
18 Hayek (1949: 184–5):
It is perhaps the most characteristic feature of the intellectual that he judges new
ideas not by their specific merits but by the readiness which they fit into his
general conceptions, into the picture of the world which he regards as modern or
advanced.
19 Morck and Steier (2005) cite Constitution of Liberty but none of the authors in the
conference volume edited by Morck discusses Hayek’s concern or his proposal for
reform.
20 Hayek (1979: 32):
Democracy, so far as the term is not used simply as a synonym for egalitarianism,
is increasingly becoming the name for the very process of vote-buying, for placating and remunerating those special interests which in more naive times were
described as the “sinister interests.” . . . I believe in fact that we should get a more
representative sample of the true opinion of the people at large if we picked out by
drawing lots some five hundred mature adults and let them for twenty years devote
themselves to the task of improving the law, guided only by their conscience and
the desire to be respected, than by the present system of auction.
21 Hayek (1979: xiii):
When the present volume leads up to a proposal of basic alteration of the structure
of democratic government, which at this time most people will regard as wholly
impractical, this is meant to provide a sort of intellectual stand-by equipment for
the time, which may not be far away, when the breakdown of the existing institutions becomes unmistakable and when I hope it may show a way out. It should
enable us to preserve what is truly valuable in democracy and at the same time
free us of its objectionable features which most people still accept only because
the regard them as inevitable.
22 Hayek (1973: 88):
Why grown law requires correction by legislation The fact that all law arising out
of the endeavour to articulate rules of conduct will of necessity possess some
desirable properties not necessarily possessed by the commands of a legislator
does not mean that in other respects such law may not develop in very undesirable
directions, and that when this happens correction by deliberate legislation may not
be the only practicable way out. For a variety of reasons the spontaneous process
of growth may lead into an impasse from which it cannot extricate itself by its
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own forces or which it will at least not correct quickly enough. The development
of case-law is in some respects a sort of one-way street: when it has already
moved a considerable distance in one direction, it often cannot retrace its steps
when some implications of earlier decisions are seen to be clearly undesirable.
The fact that law that has evolved in this way has certain desirable properties does
not prove that it will always be good law or even that some of its rules may not be
very bad. It therefore does not mean that we can altogether dispense with
legislation.
There are several other reasons for this. One is that the process of judicial
development of law is of necessity gradual and may prove too slow to bring about
the desirable rapid adaptation of the law to wholly new circumstances. Perhaps
the most important, however, is that it is not only difficult but also undesirable for
judicial decisions to reverse a development, which has already taken place and is
then seen to have undesirable consequences or to be downright wrong. The judge
is not performing his function if he disappoints reasonable expectations created by
earlier decisions. Although the judge can develop the law by deciding issues
which are genuinely doubtful, he cannot really alter it, or can do so at most only
very gradually where a rule has become firmly established; although he may
clearly recognize that another rule would be better.
This passage is stressed by Whitman (1998: 48).
23 Hayek (1943: 65–6):
What I mean by a “friendly face” does not depend upon the physical properties of
different concrete instances, which may conceivably have nothing in common.
Yet I learn to recognize them as members of the same class – and what makes
them members of the same class is not any of their physical properties but an
imputed meaning.
The importance of this distinction grows as we move outside the familiar surroundings. As long as I move among my own kind of people, it is probably the
physical properties of a bank note or a revolver from which I conclude they are
money or a weapon the person is holding. When I see a savage holding cowrie
shells or a long, thin tube, the physical properties of the thing will probably tell
me nothing. But the observations which suggest to me that the cowrie shells are
money to him and the blowpipe a weapon will throw much light on the object –
much more light than those same observations could possibly give if I were not
familiar with the conception of money or a weapon. In recognizing the things as
such, I begin to understand the people’s behavior. I am able to fit into a scheme of
actions which “make sense” just because I have come to regard it not as a thing
with certain physical properties but as the kind of thing which fits into the pattern
of my own purposive action.
24 Kahn (2005) stresses the significance of Hayek’s choice of word, “submission.”
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